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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NEW YORK, NEW HI-vLf EN
AND HARTFORD RAILROAD COMPANY. By Edwin S. S. Sunderland. Pri-
vately printed, 1948. Pp. xi, 81 and apps.
THE virtues and the defects of Mr. Sunderland's little book are all summed
up in its title; this is a very brief history, and though it is exceedingly good
so far as it goes, it of necessity ignores or gives scant treatment to many
things which should be thoroughly discussed.
It is an astonishing feat which Mr. Sunderland has performed in writing
a history at all adequate in such a short compass. This reorganization lasted
twelve years and the printed record alone-which is conspicuous mostly
for its omissions-runs to 14,000 pages. Mr. Sunderland, who was counsel
for the large Insurance Group of bondholders and later for the reorganiza-
tion committee, has crowded into his 81 pages of text not only all the im-
portant facts of the reorganization but also a bit of the color and even some
penetrating comments on the future legal significance of some of the deci-
sions which these proceedings provoked.
Where Sunderland is particularly good is in his account of the long process
by which a plan of reorganization was finally created and consummated,
to which he devotes some fifty-sLx of his pages. The arguments of each of
the innumerable parties before the ICC examiner, the Commission itself,
and the District Court are rehearsed, and by giving us these arguments and
developing the background to each of the decisions by the ICC and Judge
Hincks on phases of the plan, Sunderland makes it possible to gauge more
accurately which factors were most influential in the various decisions. And
he gives a good explanation of the segregation and severance formulae on
which railroad reorganization plans must be based. These formulae attempt
to measure the value to a railroad system of various of its branches. Only
in this way is it possible to tell how valuable an underlying mortgage, cover-
ing only a part of the system, may be, or whether a particular leased line is
worth its rent. The segregation formula is merely a mathematical means of
apportioning the system receipts and system expenses among the various
divisions of the railroad. The severance formula assumes that a particular
division is not part of the system but has gone on its own as an independent
railroad, and determines how profitable it then would be and how much its
loss would cut down the profits of the balance of the system. These formulae
are basic to railroad reorganization, but almost no information on them is
accessible to lawyers.' Sunderland does a good job of telling what they are,
and how they were used in the reorganization, even though one might wish
for more detail as to the peculiar features of the formulae for the New Haven,
1. The only discussion of these formulae generally available seems to be Mcc.: &
Masten, Railroad Leases and Reorgan:ziaiion: I, 49 YALE L.J. 626 (1940), and Meck
Railroad Leases and Reorganication: 11, 49 YALm L.J. 1401 (1940).
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and may well question Sunderland's statement that severance formulae are
based on an unrealistic assumption and are of dubious value..
2
Another very valuable feature of this book is its explanation as to the
political pressures that were at work toward the end of reorganization. As
Congress moved toward passage of legislation for a simpler procedure of
reorganization, the New Haven's reorganizers got quite scared, for fear all
their labors of so many years would be undone. (It does not require much
reading between the lines to guess that their fears were also based on the
possibility that the dominant stockholder, the Pennsylvania Railroad,
whose interest had been wiped out by the plan of reorganization, might be
able to get back its interest in the New Haven by virtue of the legislation.)
Thus one can almost hear Sunderland sighing with relief as he tells how
President Truman exercised his pocket veto power on the bill. It now is
becoming almost a commonplace for the courts to have to share with the
politicians the burdens of reorganizing a railroad,3 and it is instructive to
see the effect of political pressures in one concrete case.
Against the background of such accomplishment it smacks of caviling to
call attention to the sins of omission which I think have been committed.
But actually to point to these omissions is not to criticize Sunderland's
book, but rather to indicate the need for a longer and fuller history of this
interesting reorganization.
A more complete history is necessary because a thorough understanding
of what was done to the New Haven is essential for anyone who intends to
reorganize a railroad under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. As Sunder-
land says, these proceedings "presented virtually every difficulty which can
arise in the course of the rehabilitation of an enormously complex railroad
organization." I The fourteen appeals to the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and the six appeals to the Supreme Court brought forth
important answers to many of the most perplexing legal questions which
Section 77 had created. And study of the technique developed to cope with
the difficulties of the New Haven may save future reorganizers the long
years of trial and error which were needed here.
Of course a requiem for Section 77 has already been sung., But con-
2. P. 15.
3. A prime example is the reorganization of the Missouri Pacific, in which the
Allegheny Corporation has frequently resorted to political pressures to try to keep their
stock interest, even though the ICC and the courts have repeatedly found no equity for
the common stockholders. The latest canto in this seventeen-year-old saga involves hear-
ings scheduled by the Senate Commerce Committee for April, 1950 on a resolution intro-
duced by twenty Senators complaining because the Commission's plan will wipe out the
stockholders. Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1950, p. 2, col. 3. And the Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad twice persuaded Congress to add a chapter to the Bankruptcy Act to
authorize a "voluntary adjustment" of its obligations.
4. P. iii.
5. Polatsek, The Wreck of the Old 77: A Requiem Review of Equity Interests ini
Railroad Reorganizations Under The Bankruptcy Act, 34 CORNELL L.Q: 532 (1949).
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stitutional doubts have cast a heavy shadow across the Railroad Readjust-
ment Act,6 which had been thought to replace Old 77, and until the corpse
of the older Act has been safely interred the New Haven reorganization is
available as the case study par excellence of Section 77.
The most important deficiency of Sunderland's book is that the significant
issues which were not directly connected with the author's main love, de-
velopment of a plan, are considered in much too summary a manner to be
very helpful. In a ten page chapter labelled "Some Significant Decisions
In The New Haven Case" he tosses off the five big issues which are likely
to be of most interest to reorganizers of other railroads. The first of these,
the Connecticut Railway & Lighting Company litigation, involved whether
or not damages for breach of a 999 year lease are provable as a claim under
Section 77, and if so, what the measure of damages is. This issue went to the
Supreme Court twice, 7 and both of these decisions were severely attacked in
the law reviews.8 Sunderland, though, does little more than describe the
holdings in each of the seven court opinions and orders, without even
attempting to describe or analyze the reasoning involved.
The so-called 88 Stations Case, another of those treated very briefly by
Sunderland, caused a Supreme Court decision which stands as a landmark
on the interrelationships of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the re-
organization court, and the states during Section 77 proceedings.' The Old
Colony Railroad, a leased line of the New Haven operating around Boston,
had been shown to be quite unprofitable. The trustees, hoping to cut down
their losses there, asked the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
to allow them to dose 88 stations of the Old Colony. When that body failed
to decide very promptly, the trustees went to the reorganization judge, who
authorized the proposed curtailments. On appeal Justice Frankfurter wrote
a quite scholarly opinion showing how not even the ICC has power over the
intrastate activities of a carrier, except as part of a complete plan of reorgan-
ization for an insolvent road, and traced the positions of the Commission
and the court to demonstrate that the function of a court in railroad re-
organization is integrated with that of the Commission and that its powers
cannot rise above that of the ICC. Thus he held that Judge Hincks had
exceeded his powers here. Important considerations of policy, as well as
6. Interstate Commerce Act, § 20b, 62 STAT. 162 (1948), 49 U.S.C.A. § 20b (Supp.
1949). The constitutional doubts are examined in an illuminating Comment, Streamlined
Capital Readjustment Under Section 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act, 58 YMX. L.J.
1291, 1314-24 (1949). For a contrary view, see Hand & Cummings, Consensual Securities
M1odification, 63 Hv. L. REv. 957, 981-4 (1950).
7. Palmer v. Connecticut Raihay & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544 (1941); Connecticut
Railway & Lighting Co. v. Palmer, 305 U.S. 493 (1939).
8. The earlier decision is criticized in case notes at 52 Haa.s L. Rrv. 682, 39 COL L.
Ray. 302, and 6 U. OF CH. L. REv. 695 (1939), while the later decision is discussed at 26
CoRNELL-. .Q. 702 and 41 COL. L. Rav. 750 (1941).
9. Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79 (1939).
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law, were resolved in Frankfurter's decision, but one will not find these in
the account in this book.1"
Another important issue which Sunderland slights is the treatment of
claims of banks which held notes secured by collateral. By Order No. 1 of
the reorganization, holders of collateral pledged by the New Haven were
enjoined from disposing of it, in line with the rule of the Rock Island case.11
The collateral held by these banks, largely stock of lines leased by the New
Haven, more than covered the outstanding notes at the time of Order No. 1,
but when the leases in question were rejected it took a drastic fall. The
second circuit held when that the value of the collateral was less than the
amount of the notes, the injunction must be dissolved, since the New Haven
no longer had any equity in the collateral.' 2 And in a later decision, the
appellate court said that the banks were entitled to damages for the loss they
suffered by not being able to sell their collateral earlier, on the theory that
the loss should be borne by the parties for whose benefit the injunction was
issued. 13 Here again Sunderland tells us what happened, but without ex-
plaining why, or considering whether it was wise or unwise. And he makes
no effort to decide what course of action future reorganizers should take to
avoid these perils.
The same things may be said of the other two large issues which Sunder-
land considers only briefly. One involved the reorganization of the Boston
& Providence Railroad, whose lines were leased by the Old Colony. After
the leases were disaffirmed, the New Haven operated both the Old Colony
and the B & P for their accounts, in accordance with Section 77(c)(6) of the
Bankruptcy Act. Yet when the losses which the New Haven suffered for the
B & P's account were held by Judge Hincks to be a prior lien against that
railroad, its trustees appealed on the ground that the B & P was in reorgan-
ization in Massachusetts, and that the Massachusetts court had exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters concerning it. This issue, too, produced a
Supreme Court opinion of much importance, the Court holding against the
10. One does find them in Meck & Masten, supra note 1, at 657. and in the following
case notes: 28 GEo. L.J. 369 (1939) ; 8 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 988 (1940) ; 35 ILL. L. Rpy.
106 .(1940) ; 14 TamP. L.Q. 274 (1941). A quite lively account of the fight by the people
in the area affected to keep their railroad service is Rood, Protecting the User Interest is
Railroad Reorganization, 7 LAW & CoNTEm . PRoD. 495 (1940). Although it does not
touch directly on the problem presented by this case, CniNnGwroN, Tnz REGULArION OF"
RA.ROAD ABANDONMENTS (1948), is a good source for a broad policy orientation into
this matter. New England, in particular, is discussed at 107.
11. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
12. Merchants National Bank of Boston v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 102 F.2d 923
(2d Cir. 1939). This decision was termed "sound and desirable" in a case note, 25 VA. L.
REv. 982 (19,39).
13. In re New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 147 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 884 (1945). For the final upshot of all this see In re New York, N.H. & H, R.R.,
64 F. Supp. 487 (D. Conn. 1945).
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trustees. This opinion deserves careful analysis, particularly since it is
almost the only opinion in all these long proceedings which seems to have
been approved by legal scholars. 14 The last issue which Sunderland includes
in his chapter on significant litigation is somewhat similar: it involves the
question of whether Judge Hincks abused his discretion in permitting the
Old Colony trustees to bring a suit, of great importance to the reorganiza-
tion, in a Massachusetts state court, rather than in his court. This well
exemplifies the danger of "brief histories"; the result of this litigation is
given us in twenty-five words without any statement of the reasoning in-
volved. 5
There are many other important things one wants to know about the
New Haven reorganization which this book does not tell, but even to state
the issues with the detail they deserve would make this review longer than
the brief- history. One omission which particularly disturbed me was the
lack of a history as to why the New Haven went broke. These circumstances
have been well catalogued elsewhere,'6 but at least a summary of their high-
lights would be very valuable here. Thus, to understand the difficulties
which the leased lines caused in this reorganization, a reader should know
that these lines often were not justified economically, and were only leased
by the New Haven as part of a sordid drive for monopoly power. A sound
reorganization would have required that these lines be relentlessly pruned
from the New Haven, but without the historical background, the reader is
likely to think that they must have had some importance as part of the New
Haven, and merely needed their rentals scaled down.
The aftermath of the reorganization should also have been examined,
although of course Sunderland's book was too early to detect the trends
which are now so painfully apparent. The most devastating criticism of this
reorganization cannot be made by a legal scholar, but it is apparent from a
glance at the quotation of New Haven securities on the stock exchange. The
ICC and judges can talk as long as they like in their efforts to harmonize the
distribution of securities with the absolute priority standard to which they
are required to adhere. The fact remains that more than two years after
the reorganization was consummated, a period which should have allowed
at least moderate seasoning of the new securities, a holder of one of the old
First and Refunding $1000 bonds has a package of new securities which the
14. The decision is Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S. 132 (1940). It held that § 77(c) (6)
displays a congressional intent to give the lessee's court full powers to carry out effectively
its duty of continuing operation of the leased line, and that the fixing of a prior lien against
the assets of the lessor is one of these needed powers. Meck, supra note 1, calls this decision
"eminently justified both on grounds of precedent and for purely practical reasons."
15. P. 37: "the District Court did not have exclusive jurisdiction of the issues nor had
he abused his discretion in refusing to enjoin the state court action." The case is Banhers
Trust Co. v. Palmer, 109 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1940). West's headnotes are not much less
informative.
16. STAPLES & MlASoN, TE FAU. oF A RAuxoAD Emn, nn (1947); In re Financial
Transactions of the N. Y., IV. H. & H. ,R. Co., SEN. Doc. No. 543, 63d Cong, 2d Sess. (1914).
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market regards as worth less than $450. The old First and Refundings were
the principal senior security; junior lienholders should not have been
allowed any interest until the First and Refundings received full compen-
sation. Metaphysical notions of what is fair and equitable are little solace
to the old bondholder who must take a 55% loss should he care to liquidate
his holdings.
17
And the aftermath of the reorganization is interesting in spotlighting the
need for safeguards against an allocation which makes it ludicrously easy
for control of a railroad to be captured by new interests for a tiny invest-
ment.18 Apparently this failing will be enough to undo all the arduous work
of the reorganizers. The new management, paying about as serious attention
to the best interests of the New Haven as if it were a grandchild's Lionel
train, seem to have the road on a one way track back to the bankruptcy
court. 9
Even on the development of the plan, which Sunderland treats most fully,
I think something should have been said about the method, too involved
to go into here, of allocating securities among the various classes of secured
creditors which caused the New Haven plan to be hailed as "the closest
approach to a 'scientific' method of distribution." 20 If this method was
good, it deserves to be copied. If not, its inadequacies should be exposed.
Mr. Sunderland has been unusually successful in taking an objective view
of these proceedings, rather than being influenced by the position which he
represented throughout. The only place where a bit of prejudice seems to
creep through is where he dismisses as "strained" 21 the renowned "woosh-
woosh" dissent of Judge Jerome Frank in the court of appeals decision
which finally cleared the way for the reorganization plan to be consum-
mated. 22 Judge Frank criticized the Commission and the district court for
17. This failure to meet the absolute priority standard as realistically interpreted is
not confined to the New Haven reorganization. Thus in the reorganization of the Mil-
waukee road the "Gary bonds," a first mortgage on a small division which was earning
about 75% of its fixed charges even on the basis of the patently inadequate segregation and
severance formulae employed, were paid off 75% in preferred stock and 25% in common
stock. In re Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 36 F. Supp. 193, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1940), aff'd
sub noain. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 318 U.S. 523,
572-3 (1943). Claims junior to these bonds were allowed to participate in the reorganiza-
tion. Yet the stock awarded in exchange for a $1000 bond has a market value (as of
April 15, 1950) of only $245; and of course the holders are in a much poorer position with
regard to income and liquidation than when they held bonds.
18. An interesting, if uncritical, account of how control was obtained by a Boston
group is Capture of the New Haven, Fortune, April, 1949, p. 86.
19. See Clark, J., dissenting in Commission of the Department of Public Utilities of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 178 F.2d 559, 569
(2d Cir. 1949).
20. Friendly & Tondel, The Relative Treatnnt of Securities in Railroad Reorganiaa-
tions under Section 77, 7 LAw & CONTEMP. Pa o. 420, 431 (1940).
21. P. 73.
22. Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 161 F.2d 413, 431 (2d
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947).
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having first accepted a compromise of the parties on a particular issue,
rather than using their independent judgment as to what the parties should
get, and then disobeying an explicit mandate of the court of appeals 23 by
coming back after reconsideration with exactly the same figure and a mass
of doubletalk to try and make it appear to be an independent valuation. Mr.
Sunderland was a member of the committee which worked out the com-
promise in question, so that his distaste for Judge Frank's opinion is under-
standable. Yet the issue involved is fundamental enough as to require a
more complete statement of the case than Sunderland makes before dis-
missing the dissent so cavalierly.
There is much else that could be mentioned, that one would like to see
studied and said about the New Haven reorganization. But despite all that
is unsaid, it is sure that no one fortunate enough to have access to Sunder-
land's book will ever again try to understand the New Haven proceedings
without it.
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHTt
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE CoiMoN LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT. By
C. H. S. Fifoot. London: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1949. Pp. xvii, 446.
£2.5.0.
THOUGH modestly regarded as primarily for students, Mr. Fifoot's book
doubtless will be read quite as often, at least in the United States, by teach-
ers, particularly teachers of contracts, torts and procedure. It presents the
cases and materials out of which tort and contract history must be written,
divided of necessity into sections dictated by the forms of action, each pref-
aced by a short but illuminating commentary that serves both as a context
for the sources and as a synthesis of them. Thus the actions of debt, cove-
nant, account and assumpsit make up the contract portion of the book;
nuisance, detinue, trespass, case, trover, conversion and defamation com-
prise that devoted to tort. The old veterans of the Year Books and the
black-letter reports, whose names have long been familiar, make their ex-
pected appearances, though not always in their expected places nor always
in support of the propositions for which they usually are cited. Mr. Fifoot's
learning has turned them all, with marked success, into English, a boon to
the reader unable or unwilling to cope with the language of the unedited
Year Books, and he has added to them some new cases hitherto overlooked
and others from sources that have only recently become available. The cases
are well chosen, the materials apt, but it is primarily the narratives, which
range far beyond the sources printed, that give the book its value and make
it an unusually impressive and most useful work.
23. In re New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 147 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 884 (1945).
' Law clerk to Judge Charles E. Clark, United States Court of Appeals, Second Cir-
cuit; Assistant in Instruction, Yale Law School.
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It may be said at once that Mr. Fifoot does not shrink from breaking a
lance with foemen of substantial stature. The views of Ames and Holds-
worth on the connection between Westminster II, ca. 24, and trespass on
the case are examined and rejected. Ames's characterization of detinue as a
contractual action is recognized only to be put aside. Professor Woodbine's
attempt to find the origins of the action of trespass in the assize of novel
disseisin is subjected to pointed criticism and Holmes's view of the strict
liability of the bailee, though approved by Holdsworth, is substantially
modified. Mr. Fifoot's disagreements are not undertakqn lightly. The views
of his predecessors are examined with care and fairly summarized, the
difficulties set out succinctly, and his own views stated as clearly as the
sources permit. These are not always new, for a book that must follow paths
so well worn, over which so many have already trodden, must very often
merely confirm conclusions reached earlier. In particular, Professor Pluck-
nett's findings receive striking corroboration. But they are, on the whole,
the most plausible explanations yet advanced on admittedly vexed ques-
tions. As such, though there may be some disagreement in detail, they can-
not fail to find a warm welcome.
My own objection to Mr. Fifoot's book arises out of his treatment of
contract, though it is only fair to say that his view is widely, though in my
opinion incorrectly, held. The slow emergence of contract from tort and the
haltingly painful development of assumpsit in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries pose questions of importance for both the historian and the
sociological jurist. There is no problem, of course, if one assumes that me-
dieval England was economically backward and Tudor commercial activity
confined to the dealings of petty traders purchasing twenty quarters of
barley or extracting promises to pay a £5 debt. But if the existence of a
well-advanced and sophisticated commercial society is recognized, as it
must be, the rudimentary nature of contract, long after Slrangborough v.
Warner and Slade's Case, is an awkward stumbling block to the acceptance
of any theory of roughly concomitant social and legal change. The lag is
even more serious when it is remembered that in the next century Black-
stone's treatment of the subject did not quite fill one chapter and Lord
Mansfield had to draw heavily on Pothier, chancery practices, mercantile
usage and natural law.
Mr. Fifoot, if I understand him correctly, is inclined to see the lag elim-
inated by 1600, if not earlier. But surely this makes too much of the progress
that had been made and disregards the long road and the many difficulties
that still lay ahead. One may say that by 1550 "te modern conception of a
contract had in essence been formulated," but that date, associated with the
emergence of assumpsit as a non-delictual remedy, marks only the end of a
chapter and Mr. Kahn-Freund must be nearer the truth when he speaks of
the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth century evolution of assumpsit
into a law of contracts for the modern age. Mr. Fifoot's view, with its mini-
mization of subsequent developments, is colored, it seems to me, by a wish
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to reconcile the stage to which contract theory had reached by 1600 with the
undoubted business and commercial activity of sixteenth century England.
A similar reconciliation may be reached by recognizing the deficiencies of the
common law of contract and emphasizing the extent to which the needs of
commerce were served in local courts. Both views have their advocates, but
neither is particularly helpful, for sixteenth-century contract law is no direct
index to the expanding commercial activity of the age nor need the develop-
ment of assumpsit be correlated with that expansion.
It can hardly be denied that the large-scale economic life of the century
is not reflected in the unsophisticated cases that together comprise the
history of contracts at common law. Their names are not those of the
prominent traders, the London capitalists and financiers of Elizabethan and
Jacobean days, nor are the transactions described those of the experienced
dealer or the substantial business man. City men and their numerous
smaller colleagues used the bond, the recognisance, or the statute merchant
or staple, with which their predecessors had been provided long ago. So did
lawyers and judges, many of whom were actively engaged in a variety of
business enterprises. There was no advantage in securing, in return for a
lease, A's promise to rebuild a tenement, barn and watermill, if one might
have A's bond in the sum of £100 defeasible on such rebuilding. Similarly,
agreements executory on both sides were effected by the exchange of bonds
defeasible on the performance of acts, or by the recognition of reciprocal
recognisances, statutes merchant or staple similarly defeasible. Such trans-
actions already were appearing on the statute merchant rolls as early as 1400.
An accurate index to the commercial activity of the sixteenth century is
afforded, not by the relatively few contract cases reported in the books, but by
the overwhelmingly large number of actions of debt on an obligation entered
on the plea-rolls. The ubiquitous bond, though its form is the inherited,
largely self-executing form of the Middle Ages, disguised agreements of all
kinds; nor did this form soon change. Long after the liberating principle
"a promise against a promise will maintain an action on the case" had been
enunciated, a chancery reporter observed that if relief on forfeited bonds
could not be obtained in chancery "men would do that by covenant which
now they do by bond." Defences to bonds at common law being few, com-
mercial contract cases flowed naturally to chancery, leaving only a thin and
erratic stream of highly miscellaneous cases to the common law courts. It is
not surprising, therefore, that progress was slow or that their arrangement
into a coherent whole should still be awaited in the middle eighteenth cen-
tury. Professor Plucknett has remarked that the backwardness of the com-
mon law was due to the absence of a sufficiently large and related mass of
data, and if that is so, we may dispose of that vaguest of vague explanations
that finds common law judges reluctant to expand the domain of enforce-
able contract and sees them, "obsessed by the ever present fear of dynastic
change and intimately acquainted with the weakness of the central govern-
ment," shrinking from any final and decisive step.
1950] 1199
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Unlike the history of real property, the history of contracts is a product
of the nineteenth century and bears still the unmistakable marks of its or-
igin. The "mystery of consideration" which so absorbed Victorian lawyers
and their efforts to find a precise formula in the old cases throws rather more
light on their interests and on the questions asked in their age than it does
on the problems faced by judges in Elizabeth's reign. Similarly, the iden-
tification of contracts and commerce reflects the conditions of the nine-
teenth century, not those of the sixteenth. The correlation of these largely
unconnected developments has taxed the ingenuity of countless teachers
and has stood as an unexpressed major premise back of most writings on
contract history. The recognition of their independence will do much to
loosen the frame on which the history of contracts has been distorted.
S. E. TnORNEt
TRANSFORMING PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION. By John Bauer. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1950. Pp. xi, 367. $5.00.
Two years ago, in his Public Organization of Electric Power, Dr. Bauer
presented the case for public ownership, which he favors. Now, with even-
handed justice, he states, or rather re-states, the conditions under which
regulated private utilities can effectively serve the community. The present
work, to be sure, is not limited to electric utilities, but its emphasis is on
them. This comes about because the proposals made are workable only
where they can be brought to bear separately on the rates and returns of
each company under regulation, with respect to its local or regional opera-
tions. Interregional means of communication or transportation, especially
those like the railroads which encounter competition both within and with-
out the industry, present different problems. For example, it is not feasible
to set varying rates for the several airlines running between New York and
Chicago; and it also happens that the interregional utilities include the un-
profitable ones, especially telegraphs and railroads. Dr. Bauer's program
requires a continuing profit potential, such as is usually found in the local
monopolies of electricity, gas, water, and telephone service. Urban transpor-
tation, another local monopoly, is currently the puny member of the family;
Dr. Bauer promises us a separate monograph on its problems. After making
these classifications and exceptions we wind up, after all, with most of the
book concentrated on the electric utilities.
The requirements for effective regulation are certainly worth restating
at this time, because only in the past decade have decisions of the United
States Supreme Court removed a whole covey of constitutional albatrosses
from around the regulators' necks. The promise of the hope case, however,
is far from fulfillment. Even though "fair return on fair value" is no longer
t Professor of Law and Librarian, Yale Law School.
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a part of the Federal Constitution, state agencies must all be given a new
gospel of state power. It is the purpose of this book to bring the evangel to
the heathen: to the state courts, still contemplating the navel of due process
though the cord to the mother court has withered; to the legislatures, pre-
sumably satisfied with things as they are; and to the commissions, sunk in
routine and ineptitude.
Dr. Bauer's program has the merit of stark simplicity. He would fix, once
and for all, a prudent investment rate base for each company, building on
the fairly integrated units the Public Utility Holding Company Act has
given us. Rates would then be set to yield a return just adequate to compen-
sate present investors, as their equities emerged from the rate-base calcu-
lations, and to attract new money when needed. For the profitable utilities
that he is concerned with, payments at this rate would be substantially
guaranteed.
With such a near-guarantee, how high would the return have to be?
Little if any more, we are told, than current returns on the fixed obliga-
tions, bonds and preferred stock, that make up the bulk of public utility
financing. These obligations have been protected, of course, by a cushion
of common which bore the risks of uncertainty. But under precise regula-
tion, the author maintains, there need be no speculative element at all in
public utility investment. The chief risk the investor has borne in the recent
past has been the risk of imprecise regulation. Most of the time common
stockholders have been able to earn handsome returns on their (unwatered)
investment, because of the difficulties and delays attending rate reductions.
At other times, however, the same factors that have impeded reductions
have made rate increases almost equally uncertain and delayed. There has
existed, consequently, a real risk for equity money.
It has been an easy risk to take because the gains have far outweighed
the losses, and the net, even though it exceeded "a fair return on a fair value"
has belonged to the stockholders, not to the ratepayers. Dr. Bauer would
put an end to all that. Emphasizing the public character of utility enter-
prises, he would have done with analogies to private business, and would
segregate any earnings in excess of the guaranteed return in a "rate equal-
ization account." In fact, regulation would aim to build up such a fund for
the sake of smoothing out dividend payments without frequent rate ad-
justments. The important change in legal theory would be that the some-
time surplus, now the "rate equalization account," would be under commis-
sion, not management, control.
The logic of a fixed return to all investors obliterates any meaningful dis-
tinction between bonds, preferred stock, and common. If existing capital-
izations are not to be drastically revised, some differences in rates of return
might still be recognized-say 3% to bonds, 4% to preferred, and 5% to
common. This would compensate the stockholders for bearing the brunt
of any long-term decline in earning capacity, such as might occur if atomic
energy becomes a competitor instead of an energy source for the electric
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power industry. There is no important reason, however, why this ultimate
risk of decay should not be borne equally by all future investors. It would
be the one remaining element of uncertainty, reflected in permissible earnings
so as to make them somewhat higher than yields on long-term governments.
The one future class of securities might consist entirely of common stock, or,
if our tax laws persist in favoring debt by treating interest payments as
expense, it might just as well consist entirely of bonds.'
In any case the investor would be entitled to a fixed return and only a
fixed return, while depreciation and related accounts would be firmly ruled
to prevent the investor's equity from exceeding his original investment.
To make such an orderly elysium possible in a disorderly world, many
other improvements of public control would be necessary. First among them
would be revitalized commissions. These administrators would have to
direct far more energy and power than they now exhibit in policing consol-
idations, security issues, construction programs, accounting, significant
operating decisions, executive salaries, wages, discriminatory rates, and
service standards. Some of these may be fields the commissions have always
tried to till. If so, they have yielded little fruit, and in fact statutory horse-
power has often been lacking even if there was a willing hand at the plough.
The result our author contemplates would be a sterilized, dedicated in-
dustry. In it the investors would be nothing more than monetary milch
cows, while management, freed of the importunities of the common, would
work in happy harmony with the commissions for the public weal. To those
who fear that the proposed degree of regulation would snuff out the flame
of free enterprise, Dr. Bauer replies briskly that the utilities are not free
enterprise anyhow, they are monopolies, and public callings to boot. To
those who suspect that the proposed degree of regulation amounts to nothing
less than a wasteful duplication of managerial energy-every move the
companies made the commission would try de novo-there is a silent nod in
the direction of government operation as an economy measure. To those
who believe that, even under regulation, there must be rewards and punish-
ments to foster initiative, Dr. Bauer argues that the foreclosure of profit
opportunities affects only stockholders' and top managers. For the latter
he does not have much love anyhow. The professionals of all sorts who keep
the dynamos turning and the street lights burning are spurred by an instinct
of workmanship, not by the dividend rate.
Leaving detailed criticism to the Edison Institute, I should like to enter
one major caveat to Dr. Bauer's proposals. They foresee and indeed require
a degree of stability which is not of this cyclical world. Even if one is sure
that government will never let us sink again into the valley of the 'thirties,
another depression of any magnitude may catch the electric power industry
in maturity, rather than still growing as it was in the last depression. In-
dustry income may in the future be more sensitive to declines in national
1. Dr. Bauer's suggestion; the Internal Revenue probably would not go along with it.
[Vol, 591202
REVIEWS
income than it was in its youth. The accumulation of dividend reserves
sufficient to level off net income into the remote future is a much more
complex matter than is suggested by the two pages the book devotes to it.-
And, to take one legal look at what is subtitled "A Definite Administrative
Program", I think Dr. Bauer underrates the obstacles which state courts
might throw in the path of some of his proposals, even if a legislature enacted
the model statute he includes as an appendix. If a court can breathe life
into the Ben Avon rule of judicial trial de no-o on issues of "confiscation,"
as the New York Court of Appeals did three years ago 3 there are still enor-
mous potentialities for judicial obstruction.
Now, having presented the book's main theses, I hope fairly, I am obliged
to turn and rend it for being vague and repetitious. The vagueness lies in
the lack of illustration and example. It was perhaps an unintended by-
product of the author's desire to eschew documentation, an indulgence to
which his long expert career entitles him. He apologizes for the repetition
by saying that it is intended to help those for whom the book is witten-
nontechnical people. They will not read it. At least they will not read it
through, unless they are remarkably patient, or have promised to write a
review and have scruples. That the book is diffuse and thus dull in its impact
is a pity. It is hard to stir up much excitement nowadays about regulation.
If we are drifting into socialism, it may be because we are unaware that reg-
ulation (like competition) has never really been tried. The ideas in this
book, familiar as most of them may be to experts, could have been organized
into a systematic and at the same time a trenchant pamphlet. But without
the cutting edge, no sparks fly.
RALPH S. BROWN, Jg.t
SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION. By V. 0. Key, Jr., assisted
by Alexander Heard. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Pp. -xsi, 675,
Xiv. $6.00
FOR generations, it has been common practice to deplore the South but
to make little attempt to know it. It has been imagined, rather than thought
of, and the imaginings have been stereotypes, many of them mutually con-
tradictory. There was for example, as Professor Key points out, the South-
ern statesman who was fond of the Constitution, a balanced budget and
bourbon. He was kindly. Then there was the fiendishly reactionary South-
erner who hated little people of all races and liked Northern financiers.
2. See, for example, the discussion in chapter 19 of TaoxE, Ecoxomucs op Pumic
UTmxi'ms (1947), an excellent textbook curiously omitted from the "Selected Bibliography"
attached to the work under review.
3. Staten Island Edison Corp. v. Maltbie. 296 N.Y. 374, 73 N.E.2d 705 (1947) ; see
Benjamin, Jidial Rezie of Adminisrative Adjudication, 48 CoL L. RMv 1, 19 (1948).
1 Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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Each of these gentlemen has lived and lives today. But neither is "the
Southern politician."
This doesn't mean that Key finds no theme or consistency in Southern
politics. He emphatically does. But he finds it through careful study of the
facts and figures, not by contemplation of his own memory, imagination and
prejudices. His study is a masterful lesson in how to write a convincing,
scholarly and witty survey of politics. And it is an invaluable handbook for
anyone who wants to think, not emote, about the South.
As Key sees it, you can make one large generalization about the eleven
Southern states: all of them have-depending on the way you look at it-
a Negro problem or a White problem. This "problem," he makes clear, has
shaped the South's destiny for a century. During that period, the counties
with the highest Negro populations-40% Negro and higher-have dom-
inated Southern politics. These counties led the South into the Civil War.
They were largely, although not entirely, responsible for the disfranchise-
ment of the Negroes. They have kept racial tension alive, and with it the
South's fierce fight against outside attempts at solving the "problem." In
this "sort of sublimated foreign war," the South has had to present a united
front to the rest of the country, and that front has been the Democratic
party, the "solid South."
But, Key finds, unity on racism is about as far as Southern uniformity
goes. It produces a one-party system locally, and almost invariably sends
men labelled "Democrats" to Washington. But Mississippi's politics are
quite unlike those of Texas, and Senators Bilbo and "Cotton Ed" Smith
voted differently on almost everything except civil rights legislation and
resolutions endorsing Mother.
Key carefully examines both the local and the national scenes. In roughly
the first half of the book, he goes from state to state analyzing their politics.
Aside from the fact that each state has but one major party, there are wide
variations among the eleven systems. In Florida, for example, every man is
for himself. No primary candidate supports a candidate for another office,
for fear of losing those of his own supporters who despise the other man.
In Virginia, by contrast, the Byrd machine regularly runs slates in the pri-
maries, and the machine's enemies usually unite behind their own futile list.
Notwithstanding the variations, all eleven systems--tested by the principle
that the purpose of elections is having the voters make broad policy de-
cisions-work badly.
According to the orthodox conception of the two-party system, Party
One stays in power until its mistakes persuade enough of the people who
voted for it to vote for Party Two, whereupon Party Two gets in and
corrects Party One's mistakes. One of Party Two's major jobs, while it is
"out," is to persuade people that Party One is making mistakes. Another
job is to exist, so that when the variable voters wish to switch, there will be
an organization available in which they can effectively unite to rectify
Party One's errors. Merely having a two-party system does not guarantee
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that these jobs will get done or that the voters will be able to understand
and vote effectively on public issues. But the Southern one-party system
makes it a cinch that the jobs will not be done. There is no regular criticism
of the group in power, nor is there a political organization which the dis-
contented can vote for in the belief that it understands and will alleviate
their discontent. The result is that real policy issues can be formulated only
with difficulty, and decision by the voters is almost impossible.
Making things worse is the fact that so many Southerners don't vote in
either primaries or general elections. Calculated disfranchisement-poll
taxes, literacy tests and the Ku Klux lan-is not the entire answer. There
is at least the additional explanation that Southern voters don't get the
stimulus that the presidential carnival gives to the rest of the nation's voters
every four years. In any event, the non-voting Southerner makes it even
more likely that Southern politics will be devoid of real issues, for the non-
voter is more often poor than prosperous, and when he consistently fails
to vote, the politicians can ignore his normal wish for social legislation.
On the role of the South in national politics, Key limits himself to almost
one problem: is it true what they say about a voting alliance between the
Southern Democrats and the Republicans? Analyzing roll calls from seven
sessions of the Senate and four sessions of the House between 1933 and 1945,
he concludes that the Southern Democrats have been maligned: civil rights
issues aside, they followed their national party leaders and voted against the
majority of the Republicans pretty regularly. True, they tended to join the
Republicans on farm votes and labor matters, but these figures only indicate,
according to Key, that the real unity is not that of Southern Democrats and
Republicans, but of Southern and Northern farm interests.
I have no data with which to challenge these conclusions. Quite possibly,
I am falling back on a personal stereotype. But I suspect that Key's figures
here may be misleading. First, he has examined a vast number of roll calls,
without making any real attempt at discovering which were most important.
Second, his roll calls are in each instance taken from the first session of a
Congress. Considering the number of straight party-line decisions taken
during a first, as opposed to a second session, this seems questionable
procedure. Moreover, party discipline tends to be tighter during the session
immediately following a presidential election, owing to the patronage which
is waiting to be dispensed. Finally, I think this a situation in which figures,
as figures, lie or at least conceal the truth. For the strength of the Southern
bloc in Congress lies not alone in the votes it can muster but perhaps equally
in the strength which seniority gives to Southerners in congressional com-
mittees. Key attempts no analysis of the extent to which this weapon has
favored Southern-Democrat-Republican mutual desires.
The balance of the book is almost a handbook for the labor political action
groups which are today working in the South. Key discusses in detail the
way elections are conducted and financed, the mechanism of disfranchise-
ment, the poll tax, literacy tests, the white primary. He nails conclusively
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the old nonsense that the poll tax has disfranchised the Negro alone and
then doubles back by pointing out that if all poll taxes were repealed it prob-
ably wouldn't make a great difference in the size of the electorate-non-
voting is a popular habit, and little party machinery exists to get out the vote.
As the last example indicates, this book is loaded with indirect blasts at
the easy way out. When you get through reading Key's careful analysis,
his comprehensible statistics and the results of his on-the-spot interviews
with hundreds of Southern political figures, you may begin to suspect that
there is no such thing as an easy solution for the South's political problems.
Key offers none of his own, for he conceives his job to be the preliminary
one of identifying the problems. As far as the record makes possible, he
has done the job brilliantly. His performance is, in fact, so encyclopedic
that it's hard to pick out omissions. I should have liked some indication of
the amount of Northern money-both management and union-in Southern
elections. And while the book specifically spurns direct criticism of possible
solutions, I should have appreciated an exception for discussion of the Lodge-
Gossett Amendment. But these omissions are minor in light of the general
excellence of the study.
JAY ToPmist
t Member of the New York Bar. Law Clerk to Judge Jerome Frank, United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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